This research investigates the problems of agent coordination when deployed in highly dynamic environments such as MANETs (Mobile Ad-hoc NETworks). Several difficulties arise in these infrastructures especially when the devices with limited resources are used. All the constraints of agents' development must thus be reexamined in order to deal with such situations, especially due to the opportunistic mobility of nodes. In this paper, we thus propose a new multiagent coordination mechanism through agent coalition formation for such an environment. In order to validate it, evaluation performance tests have been conducted on an application devoted for the assistance of hospital patients and their results are also presented in the paper.
INTRODUCTION
This paper addresses the problem of dynamic coalition formation in multiagent systems deployed on ad-hoc networks. Several intrinsic difficulties arise in using these original infrastructures, which require reexamining in depth agent coordination issues. Indeed ad-hoc networks (Akyildiz, 2009) or mobile ad-hoc networks (MANET), comprise a set of mobile, autonomous nodes, which are interconnected using wireless links. The adaptive behavior of MANETS allows a network quickly reorganize itself even under the most unfavorable conditions. The topology in MANETs is dynamic, and to coordinate, nodes need sophisticated protocols that can cope with topology changing problems.
On the other hand, the main purpose of using multiagent systems (MAS) is to collectively reach goals that are difficult to achieve by an individual agent or in other words to achieve coordination (Hsieh, 2009) (Jennings, 1994) amongst the agents. In systems composed of multiple autonomous agents, coordination is a key form of interaction that enables groups of agents to arrive at a mutual agreement regarding some beliefs, goals or plans. However due to resource constraints, agents are generally selfish and try to maximize their benefits. In this paper, we study agent coordination based on coalitions. An attractive question is the way in which these coalitions are formed in these specific infrastructures. Furthermore, one of the central problems is the study of the agents' payoffs whether the proposed solution is efficient.
For coordination between the agents in traditional wired networks such as Ethernet, ADSL, there already exist several mechanisms like contract net and its extensions (Hsieh, 2009) , coalition formation (Tsvetova, 2001) , etc. However, such protocols are not suitable to MANET since they do not handle the dynamics of this networks where nodes can move, join or live the network. In fact, some related research on this problem is done in (Wang, 2005) (Christine, 2004) , but these works don't really address the problems of mobility of nodes i.e. nodes leaving and joining the environment. In this paper, we propose a new mechanism which handles the problem of nodes mobility and agent coalition formation.
The novelty in our work is the introduction of dynamic coalition formation mechanism for solving nodes' mobility problem in MANET. We show that this mechanism is time efficient and it provides better payoff for the nodes in much sophisticated and generalized way. The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Next section presents the review of the existing solutions. Section 3 describes our context with the help of an example. Section 4 focuses on the proposed mechanism and section 5 and 6 delineate the implementation results, and a conclusion respectively.
RELATED WORK
One of the approaches used for object oriented coordination in ad-hoc networks is presented in (Cutsem, 2007) . This work considers a loosely coupled object-oriented coordination abstraction, named as an ambient reference (AR). AR initiates a service discovery request for a remote object exported as a music player and whenever a node leaves the environment, the AR is rebounded to point to another principal object in the network. A similar sort of solution is proposed in (Christine, 2004) , where the concept of Egospace (which is a kind of middleware for addressing the specific needs of the agents) is explored. All the available data in the network is stored in a common data structure and whenever the agents move within their communication range their local data structure is merged to form a global view. Some other related solutions based on the common data structure for handling nodes' inaccessibility in an ad-hoc network are considered in (Cao, 2006) and (Sislak, 2005) .
The above mentioned solutions fulfill few of their results by handling some aspects related to mobility, but still there exists a problem of agents' shallow knowledge which does not represent their preferences, intentions and allocation of resources. To address this issue, Advertising on Mobile phones ADOMO (which is a partially agents' coordination approach) is proposed in (Carabelea, 2005) . ADOMO uses sending and receiving of agents' messages to address mobility issues. Another ad-hoc coordination approach has been proposed in (Wang, 2005) , where the concept of agent based Peer-toPeer (P2P) fostering is used for handling the problems like nodes dropping out and mobility.
Other then ad-hoc networks, work done by Soh et al, related to MAS learning via coalition formation is also worth mentioning here. In (Soh, 2006) , they have proposed a computer-supported cooperative learning system in education and the results of its deployment. The system consists of a set of teacher, group, and student agents. Specifically, their appraoch uses a Vickrey auctionbased and learning-enabled algorithm called VALCAM to form student groups in a structured cooperative learning setting. The approach has the traditional limitation of Vickrey auctions which does not allow agents for price discovery, that is, discovery of the market price if the agents are unsure of their own valuations, without sequential auctions.
Nevertheless, all the aforementioned coordination solutions do not behave well on environment with highly dynamics where agents need to have both the capabilities of coordination and device failure handling, these approaches fall short of giving a generalized solution.
PROBLEM DESCRIPTION
This section explains the mobility arising problem and presents an example to illustrate our approach. We are considering here the example of a hospital where software agents are deployed on several devices (figure. 1). In this figure, the chargers (Cr 1 ,
, are mobile in a sense that the staff or the patients can move them from one place to another, according to their requirements of use or charging.
For the purpose of coordination and for exchanging energy (charge) between the devices, agents are deployed at each of them. Agents need coordination if they require more energy in their devices or if they need to remain connected with other agents in the MANET. Each agent a i has its payoff function F i , which is maximized by its charge consumption and the rewards it gets after performing its tasks. Deployed agents start coordination if they consider that there is not enough energy left to move further and to achieve their tasks or if they require multi-hop communications with other agents in their environment. To give an example, let's consider a wheelchair, a cardiac monitors, and a charger which have agreed upon communication and charge sharing using some protocols, and suddenly a staff member comes and takes the charger away for giving charge to some other wheelchairs, at a different place. One node of this MANET can tell the other nodes by using some sort of routing protocols e.g. ADODV and DSR or by using agent communication approaches, that it is leaving the environment. However the problems of ICAART 2010 -2nd International Conference on Agents and Artificial Intelligence charge losing and communication breakage still remain there, since current approaches and protocols do not guarantee the resolution of such problems under these conditions.
METHOD OF RESOLUTION
As mentioned in previous sections, the main concern of our work are to handle the mobility of nodes in a MANET, so that the agents deployed on them can still communicate and coordinate effectively and their energy sharing continues without any breakage. In this section, we present our solutions to the mentioned problem mainly based on coalition formation.
Notations and Definitions
Before going further in the presentation of our mechanism, let's introduce some definitions. Let A be a set of agents. The payoff function F i of each agent a i measures the expected achiveable payoff of a i for each proposal p j . Every agent a i knows its reference state r i for which the expected payoff is minimal and tries to maximize F i . We assume that each a i of A is selfish and has a set of goals G i = {g 1 , g 2 , ..., g m } which it aims to achieve. There is one agent per node and agents communicate through message passing. Every agent a i of A holds in its view, v(a i ), a list of agents it can contact, as well as the communication cost for contacting them. This cost varies depending on the type of communication used (either single or multi-hop communication). H is the function that measures the cost of these communication hops. However, as nodes can leave or join the system, the view of an agent changes dynamically. By periodically checking the aliveness of its neighbors, an agent can update its view and exclude those agents that do not belong to the system anymore. In this model:
A 
Coalition Formation Mechanism
Before defining our protocol, let's introduce other concepts:
Coalition agreement. An agent participating in a coalition formation process approves a coalition structure or a coalition (i.e. singleton coalition structure) either because this structure represents a partial solution or a complete solution for it.
An (a i ) is inferior to another previously approved structure CS. Moreover, an agent can make Pareto concessions where the payoff of at least one participant agent can be improved with a new approved coalition structure without deteriorating the payoff of others. Other kinds of concessions can also be considered, such as egalitarian measurements of agents' utilities, etc. It is worth noting that in economic theory, we can find several sorts of concessions that an agent can make within a negotiation. In the proposed mechanism, agents focus on different forms of concessions.
In our pessimistic ad-hoc coordination protocol which is proposed for solving the mobility problem by the means of coordination, each of the nodes maintains a cache for saving temporary data about its mobility. The agents deployed on them update this cache with the latest probability information about their movements or stability (Prob mins ). In the coalition formation problem, each agent makes its proposals of coalition structures and must reach with others agreements on those which will be adopted such that the following conditions are satisfied: (1) validity: if an agent adopts a CS then this CS have been agreed on by its forming agents; (2) Agreement: no agent reaches an incoherent state after deciding; and (3) termination: every agent eventually decides. 
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We present in this section our results and experiments where all the agents are in operation together in a coordinated way under the supervision of the proposed coalition formation model. For the results to be efficient, the agents must provide better payoffs of each requester which asks for its goals to be performed. Also, total number of goals achieved (number of successful charge sharing agreements) and negotiation time (i.e. the total time for communication and goal solving measured in minutes) are the other two important parameters. The parameters are chosen as they will testify our approach in terms of its feasibility, efficiency, accuracy and scalability. The whole scenario is simulated based on the hospital example. The simulation starts with a set of agents in which any random agents a i , have some goals G i to achieve (or to get charged). They initiate a coalition formation process, p i , by firstly searching and then contacting some or all the agents in their view. After contacting, a i sends these agents the information about the charge they need, setting a timeout for reciving response. Each of the interested agents a j є v(a i ), make their proposals based on their goal solving abilities (or charging capabilities). The factor of Prob mins is considered for sending proposals. Necessary sub-coalitions are also formed in case the value of Prob mins < threshold. The main purpose of these experiments is to show the improvement with the required payoff (the charge needed in the beginning) of agents and their achieved goals or tasks (the number of charge sharing agreements successfully completed). One of our objectives is to evaluate the different values of payoffs of agents in terms of number of messages required to achieve these values. Relating this aspect, two experimental graphs have been set up. A first experiment (Figure 4 ) has been conceived to compare the initial required values of agents' payoffs (blue lines) and the values of payoffs they have achieved at the end (black lines). Here, by required payoffs, we mean the sum of various amounts of charge needed by the participating wheelchairs, while the achieved values of payoffs are the several amounts of charge gained at the end. Thus, different random sets of agents (from 10 up to 140) are generated and represented in a 2D form. The achieved payoffs are at maximum of 1211 (over a total of 1350) when the number of agents is in the range from 0 to 50 and exhibits less variability on the average. Beyond 50 agents, there is a rapid boost in the achieved payoffs reaching to a peak value of 4725 (over total of 4800). Thus, it is clear that almost 90-95% of the total required payoffs have been achieved efficiently. Figure 5 depicts the number of messages exchanged between agents, that grows with increasing values of the achieved payoffs. Next we present three different results that illustrate the agents loss which they have caused in terms of the unachieved goals (or failed tasks), time and number of messages. In figure 6 , a graph is given with the achieved payoffs and the number of unachieved goals. By unachieved goals we refer to as the number of unsuccessful agreements. This difficulty arrives when charger agents become mobile and later they cannot find their replacements in case of mobility. It is clear that the values of unachieved goals are not even in the double figures, while the achieved values of payoffs are at their maximum peak range. Thus the flow of achieved payoffs is higher and there are not much goal losses when running the simulation with increased values of agents. The experiment of Figure 7 determines different values of unachieved goals with regard to the number of message loss. In the figure, the losses in terms of tasks and messages are almost leveled off for various sets of agents (from 10 to 140) and exhibits less fluctuating pattern on average. Even with maximum of 140 agents the values of tasks and message losses are 5 and 11 respectively. Briefly, we studied in this section, how the increased values of achieved goals can influence the efficiency of our agents. Since, with the increase in number of agents, the results are more efficient, we expected to find that the higher the values of agents, the higher the average values of achieved payoffs.
Thus when using bigger scenarios (with huge number of agents) where time is not a highly concerned issue, with the main focus on achieving higher values of goals and payoffs, our ad-hoc coalition formation approach seems still an efficient solution. 
CONCLUSIONS
This paper addresses the problem of nodes mobility and the communication breakage costs, in MANET using coalition formation through MAS coordination. Several difficulties arise in these infrastructures especially when devices with limited resources are used. In order to cope with those problems, we have developed a new coalition formation mechanism, which addresses these issues in an efficient manner and increases the payoffs of each node according to its needs. In essence, the implementation and test results have shown that our approach can form coalition structures in a regular and effective manner in highly mobile conditions. The simulation results are based on several parameters including: payoff, coordination time, number of achieved and unachieved goals, number of messages. Our approach converges to an efficient position with the increase in number of agents, reaching to even better coordination and payoff at higher stages.
